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Abstract

From the 1950s to the present, the risk premium for 10-year corporate bonds vis-à-vis government bonds has
gradually increased. While this long-run upward trend in the corporate bond risk premium is relatively stable,
short run movements in the risk premium exhibit
significant variation. Certain periods are particularly volatile, with fluctuations in the risk premium reaching a
magnitude of 100 basis points within the span of one year. In the majority of these cases, sharp changes in the
risk premium occur subsequent to shocks related to political
uncertainty and/or financial market uncertainty.
This study examines the influence of financial and political shocks on the short run variability in the risk
premium for 10-year corporate bonds from 1998 to the present. The
analysis is conducted by controlling for prior month data, monetary policy, and shocks occurring between
April 1998 and April 2005 in a multivariate model. The results indicate that financial and political shocks are
significant in explaining short-run variations in the corporate bond risk premium.
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Abstract:
From the 1950s to the present, the risk premium for 10-year corporate bonds vis-à-vis
government bonds has gradually increased. While this long-run upward trend in the corporate
bond risk premium is relatively stable, short run movements in the risk premium exhibit
significant variation. Certain periods are particularly volatile, with fluctuations in the risk
premium reaching a magnitude of 100 basis points within the span of one year. In the majority
of these cases, sharp changes in the risk premium occur subsequent to shocks related to political
uncertainty and/or financial market uncertainty.
This study examines the influence of financial and political shocks on the short run
variability in the risk premium for 10-year corporate bonds from 1998 to the present. The
analysis is conducted by controlling for prior month data, monetary policy, and shocks occurring
between April 1998 and April 2005 in a multivariate model. The results indicate that financial
and political shocks are significant in explaining short-run variations in the corporate bond risk
premium.
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I. Introduction
Changes in the risk premium on 10-year corporate bonds vis-à-vis government bonds are
negatively correlated with the business cycle. Expansionary cycles are associated with a gradual
descent in the risk premium due to rising corporate profits that reduce the likelihood of default. 1
Conversely, a contraction is associated with a sudden rise in the risk premium due to declines in
profits. In response to a decline in corporate profits, credit ratings companies such as Standard’s
and Poor’s and Moody’s downgrade the credit ratings of companies that face increased risk of
defaulting on their debt payments. Default risk for firms rises during an extended contraction,
causing the slope of the risk premium to become increasingly steep. As market conditions
become more favorable, the premium gradually narrows and the business cycle pattern repeats.
Although it has historically moved with the business cycle, the risk premium has
exhibited two other trends over time. Over the long run, the premium has drifted upward,
implying that corporations have become more risky. Between the 1950s and the early 1990s, the
spread between Aaa corporate bonds and Treasury bonds ranged from 0 to 150 basis points.
More recently, this differential has shifted upwards such that the premium ranges from 100 to
250 basis points. The onset of this shift occurred between 1997 and 1999, a period noted for the
fall of Long-Term Capital management and the irrational exuberance present in the financial
markets. While the financial position of corporations was questionable during this period, there
were few doubts about the health of the economy. GDP had been growing at a sustainable rate
and unemployment was held to a reasonable level, all while maintaining a budget surplus. Given
these conditions, the upward trend in the premium correctly identified the growing disparity in
risk of corporate bonds vis-à-vis government bonds.

1

Figure 1 in the appendix plots the risk premium on Aaa bonds from 1954 through 2005. Per business cycle data
from the NBER, dates of troughs generally coincide with relative maxima and minima in the risk premium.
2
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Periods similar to the late 1990s may explain the long-run upward trend in the risk
premium, and are consistent with the hypothesis that the risk premium narrows during an
expansionary period. However, the business cycle pattern fails to account for the high variability
the premium exhibits in the short-run. At various points in time, the risk premium has become
highly volatile such that sudden changes of 50 to 100 basis points occur throughout the year.
Although infrequent in occurrence, the continued existence of these short-run spikes suggests
that other exogenous factors besides corporate and government health affects the risk premium.
Since these spikes have occurred randomly over time, some of the variability can be
explained by the occurrence of political unrest and financial shocks influencing the debt markets.
Shocks related to political and financial uncertainty have generally led to increased levels of
uncertainty and systematic risk in the capital markets. Stocks and bonds respond to this
uncertainty by becoming increasingly volatile as the market tries to incorporate new information
into the price of securities. As additional information emerges in the aftermath of the shock, the
volatility in security prices will gradually disappear until the risk premium reverts to its
equilibrium range.
This study utilizes a simple strategy to test the validity of the shock hypothesis. Using
prior movements in the premium and trends in monetary policy, I construct a multivariate model
to analyze the monthly variation in the risk premium from 1998 through 2005. Dummy variables
are incorporated into the model to control for shocks related to major political events and
financial scandals. A sample period of April 1998 through April 2005 is used due to the high
incidence of shocks during this period. Results from this analysis show that political and
financial shocks are significant in explaining short-run variability in bond risk premiums
between 1998 and 2005.

3
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II. Literature Review
There is a voluminous literature that explains the composition of the risk premium. Due
to advances in econometric modeling, recent studies are able to decompose the risk premium and
express its components in percentage terms. Longstaff, et al. (2004) constructs such a model, by
using credit-default swaps to isolate the default and non-default components in the spread.
Credit-default swaps are financial instruments that offer returns contingent upon the borrower
defaulting on bond payments. Because of this characteristic, Longstaff suggests that swaps can
be used as a proxy for default risk. Results from this study support this assumption, with default
risk accounting for greater than 50% of the premium. The non-default component, which is
representative of disparities in liquidity, is also found to be statistically significant. Tax effects,
however, are shown to be insignificant in explaining variation in the risk premium.
Elton, et al. (2001) finds further evidence of tax benefit insignificance by decomposing
the risk premium on zero coupon bonds. Since the tax code provides for a stated marginal rate,
the effects of taxation on a bond represent a constant. Consequently, controlling for the effect of
favorable tax treatment fails to significantly explain variation in the risk premium. In contrast to
the Longstaff study, Elton finds that only 20-30% of the premium relates to default risk, and
concludes that the premium is primarily determined by systematic factors and market liquidity.
Furthermore, he suggests that the residual components of the regression may be correlated with
Fama-French risk factors used to measure systematic risk in stock markets.
Research by Colin-Dufresne, et al. (2001) reiterates the importance of systematic market
risk in explaining risk premium variability. Microeconomic level variables that should
theoretically determine risk premium changes are shown to have limited explanatory power, and
residuals of the analysis are highly cross-correlated. Aggregate level factors, which are often
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dismissed by structural models, are found to be significant in determining risk premium changes.
Colin-Dufresne further concludes that the catalysts of risk premium variability are not associated
with equity or Treasury markets. Since financial variables are not responsible for the variation,
market segmentation and the liquidity concerns and transaction costs encountered by bond
market institutions are likely explanations of premium changes. The existence of these factors
could lead to supply and demand shocks in debt markets that drive the spread in bond yields.
Political uncertainty could be another cause of supply and demand shocks. Findings by
Voth (2002) showed that political uncertainty contributes significantly to volatility in stock
prices during the 1920s and 1930s. A high incidence of strikes, demonstrations, and riots caused
equity prices in 10 developed countries to fluctuate wildly throughout the period. Movements led
by radicals influenced economic conditions, as countries with a high degree of political upheaval
experienced the most severe economic shocks. This trend of chaos across nations led to
expectations of sustained social unrest, with investors fearing a repeat of the Russian Revolution
and questioning the viability of capitalism. Successive strikes and riots perpetuated these fears,
and investors responded by becoming more erratic with their securities trading. Consequently,
stock prices became increasingly volatile around the time of events associated with political
upheaval and chaos. Controlling for these factors in a GARCH model demonstrates that political
unrest is able to explain the volatility in stock prices during this era.
Since stocks and bonds respond to similar factors, a shock that increases the level of
political uncertainty or financial instability may also affect the risk premium. Figure 1 in the
appendix shows that there is an upward trend in the risk premium over the long run. However,
Figure 2 shows an extraordinarily high level of variability in the risk premium from April 1998
through 2005. Variability in the risk premium during late 2001 and throughout 2002 is
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particularly high, with fluctuations of more than 100 basis points occurring multiple times during
this period. Applying the shock hypothesis, I examine variability in the risk premium from April
1998 through April 2005. The high incidence of financial scandals and war- and terror-related
events during this period provide a sufficient sample to test the explanatory power of shocks. 2
Based upon findings from previous studies, I anticipate that shocks will be significant in
explaining the variation in the risk premium.
III. Risk Premium Framework
The risk premium is defined as the difference in basis points for 10-year corporate bonds
vis-à-vis government bonds of the same maturity. Two risk premiums are calculated for the
purpose of this study 3 :
(1)

AP = A – UST

Where A is the monthly average of 10-year Aaa corporate bonds, UST is the monthly average of
10-year Treasury constant maturity bonds, and AP represents the risk premium for 10-year Aaa
corporate bonds. Equation 2 is calculated as
(2)

BP = B – UST

Where B is the monthly average of 10-year Baa corporate bonds, UST is the monthly average of
10-year Treasury constant maturity bonds, and BP represents the risk premium for 10-year Baa
corporate bonds 4 .
Indices of higher quality bonds are chosen because of the potential for measurement
errors in lower quality bonds. Corporate debt that is less than investment grade is expected to
react to a wider array of events than would investment grade debt. This sensitivity leads to a
2

Rigobon and Sack (2005) recently demonstrated that the conflict in Iraq influenced the capital markets during the
weeks prior to and during the war.
3
Monthly data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED II Database.
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causation problem due to the difficulty in identifying which event contributed to the increased
variability in premiums. In contrast, high quality corporate debt should be less sensitive to
exogenous events and show less variability in returns. If Aaa bonds were to become more risky
due to a shock, all grades of bonds would be affected as well. Conversely, it cannot be assumed
that an event affecting junk bonds will affect Aaa bonds. For measurement purposes, using
higher quality bonds reduces the likelihood of incorrectly assessing the significance of a shock.
A risk premium results from the different characteristics of corporate and government
bonds. One reason for this difference is that government bonds are less likely to default than
bonds issued by corporations. Congress is granted legislative powers to levy taxes and print
money. Since these powers enable debt obligations to be repaid amidst periods of financial
duress, government bonds are classified as risk free investments. Corporations, however, lack
these powers and are thus more vulnerable to default when earnings decline. To compensate
investors for this risk disparity, a corporate bond generally offers a higher yield than a
government bond of similar maturity.
Differences in yield may also result from disparities in liquidity. Liquidity premiums
arise due to the number of buyers and sellers present in the market for a particular bond. For
example, U.S. Treasuries are widely held by institutional investors and governments across the
world. Due to the large number of buyers and sellers present in the market, U.S. Treasuries can
be traded with relatively low transaction costs. In contrast, investors of corporate bonds are
more likely to encounter liquidity concerns. Because corporations differ in financial health and
long-term outlook, credit ratings are used to assess the default risk of an individual company. As
its probability of default rises, a company’s credit rating declines and investors demand a greater
4

Duffee (1996) suggests that debt indices may present biased findings. Potential biases resulting from the use of
debt indices are noted in the findings section. As the goal of this study is to suggest factors that may have been
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return for lending money. However, some investors are risk averse and may avoid trading bonds
of a low quality for fear of being left with a worthless security. Similarly, strategies at some
mutual funds and pension funds are based upon trading debt instruments of a particular credit
rating. Due to these differences in investor preferences, the market for corporate bonds is more
likely to become segmented across credit ratings. In the presence of market segmentation, the
probability of holding an illiquid will rise since the cost of locating buyers and sellers has
increased. Supply and demand shocks are thus more likely to develop as some corporate bonds
become more concentrated among investors. Since it is more difficult to sell in an illiquid
market, a premium is offered to investors for holding the bond.
The final reason for a risk premium is due to differences in tax treatment. Currently, the
tax code provides that interest income from U.S. Treasuries is excluded from taxation by
municipalities and states. Corporate bonds, however, are subject to taxation by local
governments. Depending upon the municipality or state, the marginal tax rate for a corporate
bond ranges from 5% to 10%. Earnings lost from taxation represent a constant floor for the risk
premium. Holding liquidity and risk concerns equal, a corporate bond will offer a higher yield to
offset its unfavorable tax treatment. While theoretically important in explaining the risk
premium, empirical studies have demonstrated that the explanatory power of the tax difference is
limited. 5 Relative to liquidity and risk components of the risk premium, the explanatory power
of tax benefits for U.S. Treasuries is insignificant.
Part of this insignificance stems from the fact that risk and liquidity components will be
more sensitive to shocks than the tax component. Whereas it could take months for Congress to
pass new tax legislation, the market reaction to a shock will be immediate. Following a shock,

omitted in prior research, the presence of bias should not materially influence results.
5
See Longstaff (2004), Amato (2003) and Elton (2001) for more on tax effects.
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the changes in (1) and (2) should reflect greater risk and/or reduced liquidity in corporate bond
markets. 6 Theoretically, a flight to quality should occur in which investors purchase government
bonds while selling corporate bonds. This sudden change in supply and demand reduces the
yield on Treasury bonds and increases the yield on corporate bonds, thus expanding the spread
between the two debt instruments.
Shocks at the political level, such as terrorism and war, will generally have a more
profound effect upon financial markets. Acts of terror and war increase systematic risk
throughout the economy, and therefore positively affect the risk of holding corporate and
government bonds. As systematic risk increases, risk averse investors begin to sell bonds of
corporations and governments that are at risk of default. This change in preferences toward less
risky bonds thus leads to a secondary shift in the risk premium. Although the secondary shift
generally increases the risk premium due to increased demand for government bonds, there have
been periods, such as in the late 1970s, when the risk premium narrowed amidst fears of the
government’s solvency. Consequently, analyzing movements in the bond market subsequent to a
shock provides insight into unexpected changes to the risk premium.
IV. Empirical Testing
A. Data and Methodology
Table 1 presents descriptions of the explanatory variables utilized in the regression
analyses. Monthly samples are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FREDII
Database from April 1998 through April 2005, for a total of 85 observations per variable. The
following equations were constructed to explain the risk premium for 10-year corporate bonds:
(3) ΔAP = β0 + β1ΔAPt-1 + β2ΔAPt-2 + β3ΔFF + β4ENR + β5IRAQ + β6SEPT + ε

6

However, the use of debt indices to calculate the credit spread may underestimate the liquidity component.
Currently, there is not a definitive proxy to account for liquidity concerns with respect to bonds.
9
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(4) ΔBP = β0 + β1ΔBPt-1 + β2ΔBPt-2 + β3ΔFF + β4IRAQ + β5SEPT + ε
Where ΔAP and ΔBP represent the annualized monthly change in the Aaa and Baa risk
premiums 7 . Equation (3) and (4) control for stochastic factors in the risk premium by
incorporating changes in the risk premium from the prior two months. The monthly change in
the federal funds rate accounts for the influence of monetary policy on bond yields and economic
growth. Finally, I introduce exogenous shocks to the model by specifying dummy variables for
September 11th, the Enron scandal, and the Iraq war. 8
B. Results
Results of the regressions are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Equation (3) and (4) are
able to explain approximately 24% and 31% of the variation in the risk premiums for 10-year
Aaa and Baa corporate bonds. These findings support the hypothesis that shocks are significant
in accounting for variability in risk. Furthermore, the magnitude of the unexplained portion is
consistent with findings from other studies that imply the existence of a systematic component in
the risk premium 9 .
The signs on the coefficients of prior month data and the federal funds rate are intuitive
and consistent with earlier assumptions. Consider the implications of the relationship between
the risk premium in the present month relative to prior month data. A rise in the premium onemonth ago suggests that the premium will rise during the current month. Conversely, a rise in
the premium that occurred two months ago suggests that the premium will decline at the present.
Rises in the premium over consecutive months generally offset each other such that there is a
7

The equations presented represent the final result after statistical testing. Omitted and redundant variable tests
were performed to determine the inclusion of explanatory variables and reduce multicollinearity. As a result, there
are some differences in the variables included in each model, most notably among the shocks.
8
Other variables considered include changes in the slope of the yield curve and price of oil. Both variables were
eliminated through redundant variable tests. Shocks that were considered include natural disasters, Y2K, the
WorldCom scandal, and the Afghanistan war. The high probability of measurement error and the presence of cross
correlation with variables already present in the model warrants their exclusion.

10
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol2/iss1/8

10

Patterson: Twin Peaks: The Effect of Terrorism and Financial Shocks on Short

marginal increase in risk. Referring back to Figure 1, this marginal increase in risk is consistent
with evidence that states corporate bonds have grown more risky across time.
Similarly, the positive sign on ΔFF is consistent with the relationship between bonds and
the federal funds rate. The regression results show that a one-percent rise in the federal funds
rate will increase the risk premium by an annualized 0.19% to 0.21%. In general, the Federal
Reserve raises the federal funds rate to slow down the growth rate of the economy. As the
economic growth decelerates, corporate earnings decline such that there is a greater likelihood
that a firm will default on its outstanding debt. To compensate investors for this default risk, the
interest rates on corporate bonds will rise, thus increasing the size of the risk premium.
Of the exogenous events in (3) and (4), only September 11th leads to a rise in the risk
premium. Per the regression results, September 11th resulted in significant annualized increases
in the risk premium that range from 160% to 190%. Given the impact this event had on the
nation, such a finding is to be expected. Uncertainty stemming from the attack led to fears of
further terrorist actions in the U.S., thus increasing investor anxiety in a manner similar to the
political unrest of the 1920s and 1930s. 10 However, investors were unable to act on these fears
as the close of the financial markets suspended the trading of securities. Once the markets
reopened, trading volume increased heavily across the major exchanges as investors transferred
their wealth to safer securities. Although yields on Treasury bonds also increased, the increased
risk among corporate bonds more than offset the change, leading to a sharp spike in the risk
premium.
A shock to investor confidence occurred when it was revealed that public corporations
such as Enron were employing fraudulent accounting practices. Whereas the Internet companies

9

Collin-Dufresne (2001).
Voth (2002).

10
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were relatively small, Enron was a well-respected Fortune 500 company. The resulting
bankruptcy signaled that there was a systemic problem among corporations and the accounting
profession. With the validity of financial statements questioned, corporations should have been
viewed as increasingly risky and the credit spread should increase. However, controlling for
Enron in the model leads to a result suggesting that months tied to the shock led to an annualized
decline in the risk premium of 57%.
Since it is unlikely that the Enron scandal made corporate bonds less risky, there could be
some bias or extraneous factor affecting the results. One possibility for this finding is that the
debt indices reflect a survivor mentality present in credit ratings. As changes in economic
conditions and corporate earnings occur, organizations such as Moody’s adjust their credit
ratings to reflect whether a corporation has become more or less risky. During downward cycles,
more firms are downgraded from high quality debt until only the strongest corporations remain.
In response to the scandal, banks and other corporations dependent on Enron as a client or
customer could have been downgraded due to their inability to collect on an outstanding account.
Similarly, Enron’s competitors were affected amidst fears of whether accounting irregularities
were systemic throughout the energy services industry. As additional downgrades would
preserve only the healthiest corporations in Aaa bonds, the decline in the risk premium is
partially related to a survivorship bias present in credit ratings.
Expectations of corporate reform may also contribute to the negative sign on the
coefficients. Due to the magnitude of the bankruptcies, investors may have anticipated federal
intervention into financial markets. In this case, Congressional intervention led to the creation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, corporations were subject to stricter financial
reporting requirements. Noncompliance with requirements may lead to an investigation by the

12
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SEC, and may place management at risk for fines and prosecution. Penalties for noncompliance
were an effective deterrent for fraudulent behavior, and were beneficial in restoring investor
confidence. As investor confidence improved, corporations may have been viewed as less risky
and the credit spread should have declined.
In March 2003, a second political shock occurred when the U.S. declared war on Iraq.
Similar to Enron, the Iraq conflict unexpectedly had a negative influence on the risk premium.
Part of the effect may relate to investors anticipating the war. During the conflict in Afghanistan,
it became clear that the government was considering an invasion of Iraq. Links between Saddam
Hussein and al-Qaeda began to surface, as well as evidence suggesting Iraq was accumulating
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). War expectations were further fueled by disagreements
between the United Nations and President Bush in the fourth quarter of 2002. Whereas President
Bush demanded immediate intervention in Iraq, the U.N. advocated obtaining sufficient evidence
of WMDs before considering sanctions or other actions. As the debates continued, expectations
of a conflict continued to grow up to the date that war was declared.
Uncertainty regarding the length of combat and its effect upon the economy also
influenced the market for U.S. Treasuries. President Bush’s economic plan to stimulate the
economy through tax cuts resulted in lower tax revenues for the government. Without these
revenues, the U.S. had to float more Treasuries to attain sufficient funds for government
programs and war efforts, which would exacerbate the budget deficit. Confronted with a rising
budget deficit, a looming war, and a stagnant economy, it is not unexpected that investors viewed
the U.S. Treasury as an increasingly risky investment.
Investor risk perceptions are confirmed in Figure 3, which plots the movement of 10-year
Treasury yields between 1998 and 2005. Note the increase in basis points leading up to the war,
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and coinciding with the military’s occupation of Baghdad. A rise in basis points at these times is
indicative of investor uncertainty and fear of the ramifications of a prolonged engagement.
Some of this uncertainty may relate to the terror alert system utilized by the Department of
Homeland Security during this period. The terror alert system relied upon five colors to provide
a likelihood of risk of a terrorist attack on a given date. In practice, the terror alert system
remained largely unchanged throughout the war. Since the terror level soon became mundane,
reporters focused on more relevant news in their coverage of the war. Only on dates where the
Department of Homeland Security increased the terror alert level did the media networks devote
significant coverage to the likelihood of an attack. Although the terrorist actions never
materialized, the change in the terror level influenced investor expectations about the health of
the U.S. economy.
Amidst the uncertainty surrounding the economy, corporations were becoming less risky
as earnings growth had begun to accelerate. In the period prior to the war, the major stock
indexes declined rapidly due to the failure of the Internet companies and the high incidence of
financial scandals. After declining throughout 2002, the major stock indexes recovered in early
2003 from firms exceeding earnings expectations. As more firms beat estimates and raised
guidance levels, there was less risk that a corporation would default on its bond payments. Since
corporate bonds had become less risky, the yields on these instruments declined as the increased
demand led to higher prices. Combined with the rise in the risk of government bonds, the
decline in yields on corporate bonds contributed to the diminishing risk premium.
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IV. Conclusion
In this study, evidence is presented that financial scandals and war- and terror-related
shocks contribute to changes in the risk premium on 10-year corporate bonds. Depending upon
the credit rating used, the shock-based model explains 24-31% of the variation in the risk
premium between 1998 and 2005. These findings help explain why risk premiums fluctuated
considerably during the early 2000s. Corporate fraud at Enron resulted in increased skepticism
towards corporations and accounting practices. Subsequent scandals at HEALTHSOUTH,
WorldCom and Tyco, and the high incidence of earnings restatements further reduced levels of
investor confidence, and provided evidence of a systemic problem at corporations. Investor fears
of corporate malfeasance ran high, and rumors of SEC investigations could cause the price of a
security to plummet. Concerns about governance practices and the financial position of
corporations were heightened by economic conditions at the time. Rising deficits and
unemployment levels, and fears of deflation led some to wonder if the U.S. had entered into a
period of stagnation similar to Japan. With the government engaged in wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, investor uncertainty about the health of the U.S. economy resulted in high levels of
variability in the risk premium.
These findings provide grounds for future research of the effects of shocks. One
potential bias of this study was the survivorship mentality of the aggregate bond indices.
Decomposing the indices into individual bonds could eliminate this bias, and may explain more
of the variation in the premium. Performing a cross-sectional regression on samples from
different industries could show how shocks affected risk in different sectors of the economy.
The shock hypothesis could also be explored further in a long run study or additional event
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studies of other periods. For the long run study, a GARCH model could be used to analyze risk
premium volatility resulting from shocks.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Aaa Credit Spread and Troughs, 01/1954 – 04/2005
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Figure 2: Aaa Risk Premium, 01/1998-04/2005
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Table 1: Explanations of Data in Regression Models
Variable

Description

β1ΔAPt-1

First lag of the change in the Aaa spread

β2ΔAPt-2

Second lag of the change in the Aaa spread

β3ΔFF

Change in Federal Funds rate

β4ENR

Enron dummy variable; 1 if 10/01 - 6/02, 0 if not
Iraq war dummy variable; 1 if 11/02 - 4/05, 0 if
not
September 11th dummy variable; 1 if 9/01, 0 if
not

β5IRAQ
β6SEPT
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Table 2: Results of Regression on the Aaa Premium
N = 85
Variable

Coefficient (S.E.)

β0

25.27
(13.59)

β1ΔAPt-1

0.37
(0.11)

β2ΔAPt-2

-0.24
(0.11)

β3ΔFF

0.21
(0.13)

β4ENR

-51.01
(34.53)

β5IRAQ

-57.32
(22.20)

β6SEPT

190.54
(93.70)

Adj. R2

0.2423

Significance Levels:
*: 1%
**: 5%
***: 10%
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Table 3: Results of Regression on the Baa Premium
Dependent Variable: ΔBP
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1998M04 2005M04
Included observations: 85 after adjustments
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
Prob.
C **
15.8412
8.9013
0.0790
ΔBPt-1 *

0.4761

0.1059

0.0000

ΔBPt-2 *
-0.2544
0.1056
0.0183
ΔFF **
0.1890
0.0878
0.0344
δSEPT *
160.7087
65.8644
0.0169
δIRAQ *
-42.7648
15.5096
0.0072
2
Adjusted R
0.3058
Durbin-Watson stat
1.9248
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
F-stat
0.3209
P. F(2,77)
0.7265
2
2
Obs. x R
0.7026
P. χ (2)
0.7038
Significance Levels:
*: 1%
**: 5%
***: 10%
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Figure 3: 10-year Treasury, 4/1998 – 4/2005
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